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INTRODUCTION 
The institutionalist movement in American economics thrived dur-
ing the period between the two World Wars. The institutionalist ap-
proach to economics stresses four key points: (1) the importance of insti-
tutions (defined both as social rules and organizations) in the determina-
tion of economic outcomes; (2) the changing and changeable nature of 
these institutions; (3) the many problems and failures created by existing 
market institutions; and (4) the resulting need for new forms of “social 
control” through institutional change. Institutionalism combines these 
positions with a strongly empirical view of scientific method and a 
pragmatic and instrumental philosophy borrowed largely from John De-
wey.1 
Even this very brief description of institutionalism is enough to in-
dicate that institutionalists had an interest in law. Institutionalists such as 
John R. Commons, J.M. Clark, Robert Hale, Walton Hamilton, Rexford 
Tugwell, and Leo Wolman all contributed to an institutionalist literature 
on law and economics. Of these scholars, both Hale and Hamilton moved 
into law schools, Hale to Columbia Law School and Hamilton to Yale 
Law School in 1928. Furthermore, there were close relationships be-
tween institutionalists and legal scholars of the realist school such as 
Karl Llewellyn, W.W. Cook, Underhill Moore, Herman Oliphant, 
A.A. Berle, and Thurman Arnold. 
The institutionalist interest in law was both analytical and instru-
mental. The analytical aspect dealt with the relationship between law and 
economic outcomes: the issues of how the law shapes economic activity 
both through organizations and individuals, and how the law itself 
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changes over time, through court decisions and the actions of legisla-
tures. The interest in law as an instrument related to the institutionalist 
concern with “social control.” Social control meant developing the 
means for an “intelligent handling” of contemporary economic prob-
lems.2 Institutionalists attributed problems such as business cycles, un-
employment, workplace accidents, labor unrest, poverty, monopoly, re-
strictive trade practices, manipulation of consumer wants, resource dep-
letion, externalities of various kinds, and waste and inefficiency to a fail-
ure of markets—or “pecuniary institutions” more generally—to control 
or direct economic activity in a manner consistent with the public inter-
est. The institutionalist notion of an economics relevant “to the problem 
of control” required an economics that “relate[d] to changeable elements 
of life and the agencies through which they are to be directed,”3 and this 
naturally created a close interest in the law as a means of social control. 
It is this second aspect, specifically law as an instrument for the control 
of business,4 that is the primary focus of this Article. 
In the early 1920s through to the mid-1930s, the interest in law as 
an instrument for the control of business became especially urgent as 
many of the institutionalist attempts to further develop regulation and 
intervention in the economy ran into particular problems in the courts. 
Legislation was frequently struck down or circumscribed by court deci-
sions and interpretations. Legislation involving minimum wages, regula-
tion of hours of work, regulation of prices, and unemployment insurance 
all ran into difficulty. Leo Wolman, writing in 1927, lamented the retreat 
from social control that had occurred since the First World War, and the 
increasing resistance to even “modest programs of reform,”5 a point of 
view widely shared among institutionalists. This problem with the courts 
culminated during the New Deal with Roosevelt’s threat to pack the Su-
preme Court. 
The institutionalist approach to law and economics declined mar-
kedly after the Second World War and was replaced by a very different 
law and economics literature associated with the Chicago School. This 
literature represented a clear rejection of the institutionalist arguments 
for more social control and a renewed emphasis on the market and the 
ability of market forces to generate efficient results. The Chicago School 
saw government intervention much more as the source of problems ra-
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ther than the solution. There are, however, links between the Chicago 
School and the institutionalists. Both contain discussions of court deci-
sion-making, both contain important considerations concerning antitrust 
and patent law, and both deal with issues of agency capture and the use 
of government regulations as barriers to entry. 
This Article begins by examining the institutionalist approach to the 
issues of law and economics, concentrating on the work of Walton Ham-
ilton. Hamilton devoted considerable attention to the issues of judicial 
decision-making, and to antitrust and patents in particular. He was close-
ly involved in various phases of the New Deal: in the Consumers’ Advi-
sory Board of the National Recovery Administration; in a series of im-
portant studies of pricing in a wide variety of markets; and in work with 
Thurman Arnold on antitrust and patents. The Article will then briefly 
discuss the Chicago School of law and economics with a concern for 
both the points of difference and points of contact between the Chicago 
and institutionalist literatures. 
I. PUBLIC INTEREST LEGISLATION AND JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING 
One of the key questions in the legal-realist approach and institu-
tionalist approach to law concerned how courts actually decide cases. 
The realist answer was that court decisions “could not be deduced me-
chanically from an abstract jurisprudence of rights, but emerged instead 
from the unexamined and unarticulated cultural and political assumptions 
of the judges themselves.”6 Institutional writers expressed this in terms of 
the role of the “habitual assumptions” of judges: “Supreme courts, like 
individual human beings, are dominated by these habitual assumptions 
arising from the prevailing customs of the time and place.”7 The opinions 
of the court “change by changes in judges, or by new cases which present 
old assumptions in a new light, or by changes in economic or political 
conditions, or even by revolutions.”8 Hamilton certainly shared these 
views and was particularly concerned with the habitual assumptions of 
the more conservative members of the Supreme Court. Hamilton be-
lieved these habitual assumptions were out of touch with the changed 
economic realities generated by American industrialization.9 
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For Hamilton, the underlying question was “the kind of thing the 
Constitution is”: is it “a fetish which must be served whatever be the re-
sulting inability of the State to look after its own affairs,”10 or is it “an 
instrument of government” and an “[i]nstrument of [p]ublic [w]elfare”?11 
Hamilton in particular criticized Justice Sutherland, who often spoke for 
the conservative majority of the Court, while he sympathized more with 
the opinions of the liberal contingent of Justices Holmes, Stone, Bran-
deis, and Cardozo (after he replaced Holmes).12 For Hamilton, the com-
ing of industrialism had created a host of new economic and social prob-
lems that demanded some response in the form of state regulation, in-
cluding the regulation of prices, and in his view there was nothing in the 
Constitution that prevented the use of the police power of the state in the 
cause of public welfare.13 
An example of the type of critical analysis of judicial decisions 
Hamilton’s work provides appears in his article The Regulation of Em-
ployment Agencies, which dealt with judicial interpretation of the phrase, 
“affected with a public interest.”14 The majority of the Court had denied 
the state of New Jersey the right to regulate the fees charged by private 
employment agencies.15 Hamilton presented the majority opinion, written 
by Justice Sutherland, in the form of a syllogism: 
The major premise comes easily; if a business is not “affected with 
a public interest,” the fixing of prices by the state is “a deprivation 
of property” without “due process of law.” The minor premise 
presents more difficulty and is achieved only through a series of 
steps. They are in order: (1) the business of dealing in theatre tickets 
has been held to be not “affected with a public interest”; 
(2) therefore, the work of “a broker, that is of an intermediary” is 
not “affected with a public interest”; (3) “the business of securing 
employment for those seeking work and employees for those seek-
ing workers is essentially that of a broker”; and (4) therefore, the 
business of running an employment agency is not affected with a 
public interest.16 
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Hamilton raised many questions. Does the regulation of fees 
amount to price fixing?17 “Why is the statute not valid under the police 
power, as a regulation” designed to correct a persistent and well-
recognized evil?18 “Why does the concept of ‘public interest’ have to be 
employed . . . [in the cases involving regulation of] price when it does 
not have to be [so] used to justify” many other forms of government reg-
ulation?19 What exactly is the basis for “affectation with a public inter-
est” if not a “need for regulation . . . evidenced by (1) the importance of 
the business to the public, and (2) the failure of the competitive system to 
protect” the public interest?20 Where does the category of “brokers” 
come from, all of whose business is not affected with a public interest?21 
“[W]hy does the basis of distinction lie in a mere . . . stage of a market-
ing process . . . [with no connection to the issues of] evils, regulation, 
or . . . government[] control?”22 
Hamilton contrasted Justice Sutherland’s opinion with the dissent-
ing opinion written by Justice Stone (and supported by Holmes and 
Brandeis), which he found “simple, clear cut, and direct.”23 As the issue 
was “the validity of an act of regulation,” Stone “look[ed] to see whether 
there was warrant for the specific exercise of power.”24 He was interested 
in whether evils existed, whether they were grave and persistent, and 
whether they had adverse consequences for the public.25 He asked 
whether the regulation was suited to its purpose. He had no difficulty 
distinguishing ticket brokers from employment agencies in terms of their 
importance to the public. Instead, he saw the action of the legislature “as 
a proper regulation” designed to remedy a public evil. Hamilton viewed 
the minority position as in accord with the longer legal tradition and be-
lieved that Sutherland and the “conservative” majority were providing 
the “radical innovations” and “read[ing] into the Constitution of the 
United States the original ideas of ingenious attorneys for plaintiffs-in-
error.”26 
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Hamilton’s experience with analyses like the above led him to in-
quire more deeply into the beginnings and subsequent histories of inter-
pretation of a number of key legal concepts and doctrines. His most sig-
nificant investigations are of “affectation with a public interest,”27 the 
Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment,28 and interstate commerce.29 
A. Affectation with a Public Interest 
“Affectation with a public interest” was a significant concept for 
Hamilton and the institutionalists with regard to state regulation. Accord-
ing to Hamilton, “affectation with a public interest” is a term lifted from 
a decision of Lord Hale in England in 1676 concerning the regulation of 
charges at a public wharf. Hale does not stress the term, and he does not 
make it a test for the right of the state to regulate prices. At that time, the 
regulation of prices was commonplace; in England “even to this day Par-
liament decides for itself how far it may go in the control of industry.”30 
The term came into American law in the famous case of Munn v. Illi-
nois31 in 1876, concerning the regulation of charges by grain elevators. In 
that case, the elevator operators argued that the “affectation with a public 
interest” principle limited legislative action to only those businesses af-
fected with a public interest. They lost the case, but the Court accepted 
their interpretation of principle. In successive decisions, the principle 
went through some changes in definition that extended the concept but 
narrowed its meaning. It was used to allow regulation of railway rates on 
the grounds of “public use.” The concept was later translated back to a 
broader “public concern” with business, and by 1914, the principle had 
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become “a general, if indefinite, invitation to the legislature to extend 
price control where public concern demands it.”32 In the 1920s, institu-
tionalist writers explicitly looked to the principle to provide a legal basis 
for the regulation of business.33 
Legal interpretations, however, began to change more drastically 
with the Supreme Court of 1921–1923. This Court “formal[ly] recog-
ni[zed] ‘affectation with a public interest’ as a definite test of constitu-
tionality” of price-fixing regulation but still sought to narrow its range.34 
The test was more often invoked to prevent regulation, leading Hamilton 
to comment that throughout the 1920s “a phrase brought into constitu-
tional law to sanction price fixing” was “consistently used to outlaw 
price fixing.”35 The principle became a barrier to states’ ability to re-
spond to public concerns via price regulation; the constitutional “test” of 
affectation was substituted for a recognition of police power and an ap-
praisal of the need for and reasonableness of the regulation in question. 
B. The Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses 
The injunction that “[n]o person shall be . . . deprived of life, liber-
ty, or property, without due process of law”36 was contained in the Fifth 
Amendment, but until after the Civil War was regarded as a procedural 
concern only. After the Civil War, the Legislature passed the Fourteenth 
Amendment to ensure the rights of the newly enfranchised blacks. The 
key phrases in the Amendment are “all persons born or naturalized in the 
United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the 
United States and of the state wherein they reside,” and: 
[N]o State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall 
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due 
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws.37 
Hamilton traced the history of the attempts to read substantive 
rights into the Due Process Clause. The first of these occurred with the 
well-known Slaughter-House Cases of the 1870s.38 In these cases, a cor-
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poration had been given a monopoly on slaughtering, and independent 
slaughtermen argued that their property—the right to follow their trade—
had been removed without due process.39 The argument failed.40 A few 
years later, when the monopoly privilege was revoked, the corporation 
attempted the same line of argument.41 It, too, failed, but two concurring 
justices revisited the original case and argued that the original grant of 
the monopoly privilege was indeed unconstitutional and should never 
have been given in the first place. Despite these decisions, the due 
process argument remained in use, “acquir[ing] [a] momentum and an 
enhancing repute in the opinions in dissent.”42 The power of the Fifth 
Amendment was strengthened in 1886 when the Supreme Court held that 
the term “person” included corporations and extended to them the protec-
tion of due process and equal protection.43 
These judicial rulings created, in the name of due process, a “judi-
cial overlordship over what had up to the moment been set down as the 
province of the legislature.”44 In later decisions, the word “liberty” be-
came defined to encompass “freedom of contract,” but, according to 
Hamilton, it was only in 1905 and the case of Lochner v. New York that 
“due process first won in a clean-cut combat” with the regulatory power 
of the state.45 
The Lochner case concerned the regulation of the work hours of 
bakers, purportedly on grounds of public health. The Court held that 
“[f]reedom of contract . . . was an aspect of liberty and property which a 
state might not abridge without due process of law.”46 The majority’s 
opinion “was intended to be an apostolic letter to the many legislatures in 
the land appointing limits to their police power and laying a ban upon 
social legislation.”47 The case, however, also occasioned Justice 
Holmes’s famous dissent where he argued that the relation of the hours 
of bakers to public health was one of fact, that “[g]eneral propositions do 
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not decide concrete cases,”48 that “[t]he liberty of the citizen . . . is inter-
fered with by school laws, by the Post Office, by every state or municipal 
institution which takes his money for purposes thought desirable,”49 and 
that “[t]he 14th Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer’s Social 
Statics.”50 
Hamilton was more in line with the dissent than the majority in 
Lochner. He argued that while “[i]t is common for latter-day liberals to 
set this down as the first blast of the trumpet in behalf of a social over-
sight of human rights . . . the historian is more likely to view it as a lance 
worthily broken in behalf of an ancient cause now in retreat”:51 
A constitutional doctrine contrived to protect the natural rights of 
men against corporate monopoly was little by little commuted into a 
formula for safeguarding the domain of business against the regula-
tory power of the state. The chartered privileges of the corporation 
became rights which could be pleaded in equity and at law against 
the government which created them. In a litigious procedure in 
which private right was balanced against the general good the ulti-
mate word was given to the judiciary.52 
C. Interstate Commerce: The New Deal and the NRA 
Hamilton, as noted above, was closely involved with the New Deal 
and the National Recovery Administration (NRA). While Hamilton was 
himself critical of the actual workings of the NRA codes and the encou-
ragement they gave to monopoly pricing, he felt that the NRA could be 
reformed to work as a system for the control of business practice in the 
public interest.53 Therefore, it is not surprising that he reacted negatively 
to the series of Supreme Court decisions that struck down the NRA code-
making machinery in 1935, and then the Bituminous Coal Conservation 
Act (Guffey Coal Act) and parts of the Agricultural Adjustment Act 
(AAA) in 1936. Hamilton outlined the course of development of Court 
decisions: in 1934 in the Nebbia case “it was willing to allow remedial 
legislation to take its course”; in the next year, the Court first began to 
use “procedural devices” against federal legislation, but then moved to 
substantive issues to strike down the industrial codes of the NRA.54 “By 
the winter the Court was ready to pass the death sentence upon the Agri-
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cultural Adjustment Act; and in the spring of 1936 it laid on with aban-
don against all social legislation, state and national.”55 Fear of the Presi-
dent’s power and the “ghost of an imaginary fascism” deflected even 
Brandeis and Stone from their customary views.56 
In the NRA case, the Court held that the NRA codes represented an 
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to the President. Cardozo 
and Stone concurred but did not go as far. They also found the delegated 
powers granted to be too unconstrained, but they agreed that Congress 
itself could not set up standards for regulation for all industries given 
their variety and number.57 The case concerning the AAA was decided 
by a majority of the Court who found the tax on processors that provided 
revenue to pay farmers to take land out of production—a central part of 
the program—to be coercive and unconstitutional. Stone, Brandeis, and 
Cardozo dissented on the grounds that the tax was levied in accord with 
legislation passed by Congress, and “Courts are not the only agency of 
government that must be assumed to have capacity to govern.”58 
The Guffey Coal Act was passed in 1935 to replace the NRA code 
and to regulate prices, minimum wages, maximum hours of work, and 
“fair practices.” A tax was levied, but those who complied were given 
tax refunds. The Act established a National Bituminous Coal Commis-
sion, a Coal Labor Board, and a Consumers’ Council. In 1936, the Act 
was declared unconstitutional, largely on the grounds that labor condi-
tions were local, not interstate evils and therefore did not fall under fed-
eral jurisdiction. Cardozo, Brandeis, and Stone again dissented, taking 
the view that coal production was an interstate business and that the con-
ditions in the coal industry meant that “Commerce had been choked and 
burdened; its normal flow had been diverted from one state to another; 
there had been bankruptcy and waste and ruin alike for capital and for 
labor. The liberty protected by the Fifth Amendment does not include the 
right to persist in this anarchic riot.”59 
Hamilton poured scorn on the view that interstate commerce was to 
be narrowly construed to apply only to interstate movement of goods. 
This interpretation was the one Justice Sutherland claimed was “used in 
the Constitution.”60 Hamilton argued that such prohibitions as Justice 
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Sutherland discovered were not plainly in the text of the Constitution, but 
were the result of attaching new meanings and constructions to words, 
and reading into the Constitution meanings and economic philosophies 
quite alien to the minds of its framers.61 In Hamilton’s view, the Consti-
tution was written by a group with a mercantilist mentality, for whom 
“commerce” meant nothing less than the whole of production and trade.62 
He found it paradoxical that “[a]s industry has become more and more 
interstate in character, the power of Congress to regulate has been given 
a narrower and narrower interpretation.”63 
II. HAMILTON, ANTITRUST, PATENTS, AND CORPORATE PERSONALITY 
After the demise of the NRA, the New Deal entered a second phase 
with a renewed stress on antitrust as a tool with which to control busi-
ness. In 1938, Thurman Arnold was appointed head of the Antitrust Di-
vision of the Department of Justice. In the past, Arnold had been a severe 
critic of the antitrust laws,64 but he came into his new job determined 
“that the anti-trust laws should be revised so that the government could 
strike at market domination, regardless of how the power over prices had 
been acquired and regardless of motive or intent.”65 Arnold had been a 
long-time colleague of Hamilton’s at Yale, and between 1938 and 1945, 
Hamilton worked with Arnold as a Special Assistant to the Attorney 
General. 
Previously, Hamilton had been engaged in a series of price studies, 
in connection with the New Deal discussion over price policy, some of 
which were published as Price and Price Policies.66 These studies dem-
onstrated to Hamilton the wide variety and ever-changing nature of the 
practices used by businesses to restrict competition.67 He realized that 
industries are not alike; there is no sharp demarcation between competi-
tion and monopoly. In other words, “a program of control can be 
crowded into no set formula,” and since trade practice is always develop-
ing, “the exercise of authority must be grounded in a continuing explora-
tion of industrial arrangements.”68 Hamilton felt that Arnold’s approach 
to antitrust linked exactly to this. Hamilton wrote: 
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[Arnold] is definitely persuaded that if the Anti-Trust Acts are to 
serve a constructive purpose, they must come to grips with the web 
of usage in distinctive industries, so he wants to get a number of in-
dustrial studies underway. Each will appear as a memo and in form 
should be comparable to an opinion of the United States Supreme 
Court that grapples with the law as public policy and stakes its 
judgments upon a recitation of industrial fact.69 
On the same day, Hamilton wrote to the publisher of Price and 
Price Policies that Arnold was insisting that the Department of Justice 
“get down to concretions,” and deal with the “web of industrial usage,” 
and that Arnold’s approach was “an application of the approach worked 
out in ‘Price and Price Policies,’ and [he wished there was] some way of 
advertising the fact.”70 
In his earlier work, Hamilton had been sharply critical of the anti-
trust laws. The Sherman and Clayton Acts and the Federal Trade Com-
mission were attempts to enforce competition based on the textbook 
model of competitive markets. Hamilton believed that model was one 
that applied to a world of “petty trade” and not to a world of modern 
technology and big business. The antitrust laws, in their attempt “to stay 
the development of large-scale enterprise and to make big business be-
have as if it were petty trade”71 embodied and “express[ed] the common 
sense of another age.”72 Hamilton also pointed out the difficulties in 
translating economic concepts into legal categories such as “conspiracies 
in restraint of trade”; the clumsy attempts by courts to decide issues of 
trade practice; the business tactics of delay and invention of new and al-
ternative practices; the way decisions made in one case sometimes be-
came unfortunate and limiting precedents in others; and the uneven en-
forcement of antitrust laws.73 Hamilton did not see the potential positive 
role of antitrust law in attacking bigness as such, but only its role in ap-
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proving or disapproving of business practices, a function similar to that 
which he had desired of the NRA. 
Hamilton’s work with the Antitrust Division did not change his 
opinion of antitrust laws. Though he did other work,74 the major products 
of Hamilton’s time with the Antitrust Division were two reports for the 
Temporary National Economic Committee (TNEC): Antitrust in Action75 
and Patents and Free Enterprise.76 In the first of his TNEC studies, and 
in a related paper,77 Hamilton repeated many of his concerns about anti-
trust but also voiced new concerns. He discussed the development of new 
forms of restraint, involving various forms of tacit collusion, price lea-
dership, delivered price systems, “quality standards,” patents and license 
agreements, unequal bargaining power between large manufacturers and 
their suppliers or distributors, and regulations originally enacted to pro-
tect a public interest being turned into a “smoke screen for vested inter-
est.”78 
Hamilton suggested two avenues of change: a “streamlining” of the 
Antitrust Acts and a move to an administrative rather than a judicial 
base. Streamlining would involve providing adequate funding, a power 
of subpoena, a greater use of the equity decree in place of criminal ac-
tions, a shift from crime to tort, a penalty equal to twice the total net in-
come gained during the period of wrongdoing, placing the burden of 
proof on the party that enjoys access to all the facts, and providing the 
consumer with a cause of action.79 Additionally, a move to an adminis-
trative rather than judicial base would be necessary to penetrate to “the 
heart of the difficulty.” This movement could provide for a flexible and 
timely case-by-case approach. 
Hamilton had specific concerns for how the administrative shift 
would take place and how it would function. The new system could not 
“come into practice full blown” but would “begin as ‘a cautiously expe-
rimental power.’”80 An administrative system would allow for the ap-
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proval in advance of “a code of industrial behavior,” with “[t]he govern-
ment and industry in cooperation spell[ing] out a line of business activity 
which is believed to accord with public policy, and in the furtherance of 
which immunity from prosecution is promised.”81 Because conditions 
change, agreements could not be permanent, meaning every measure 
would be subject to correction. Agreements would require oversight and 
policing, and breaches would be treated as a civil offence, punishable by 
fines. A “Decree Section” would be established, concerned with industri-
al analysis and remedies rather than litigation. Judicial review would on-
ly be by a “specially constructed industrial court” with five or seven 
members well-versed in the ways of industry.82 
As a caveat to his proposals, Hamilton raised the potential problem 
of administrative processes being “captured” by the business interests 
they are supposed to regulate. Commissions have “clos[ed] public utili-
ties to outsiders”; “the various agricultural controls . . . have been very 
sensitive to the plight of the farmers, negligent of farm labor, and indiffe-
rent to the general public who must pay the bill”; “[t]he NRA . . . staged 
a full dress performance of the hazards of the administrative process” in 
which “wide powers were granted . . . [only] to become sanctions under 
which the strategic group could lord it over the industry.”83 
A. Patents and Privileged Market Positions 
The issue of patents and their use in certain industries to maintain 
privileged market positions also came to Hamilton’s attention during his 
price studies. Hamilton came to see this issue as an extremely important 
and particularly difficult policy problem. He believed that knowledge 
was more important than real property, natural resources were largely 
what the current state of knowledge makes them, and “modern indus-
try . . . [was] nothing more than our accumulated technical knowledge.”84 
For those reasons, abundant production and rising standards of living 
rested on the advance of knowledge and its dissemination. 
The purpose of a patent is the promotion of technological advance, 
but Hamilton’s investigations indicated to him that the existing patent 
system had numerous failings in achieving that end. Research and inven-
tion had become a matter of corporate research and development labora-
tories. In the hands of corporations, the patent system could easily be 
used to create control of an industry. A flood of closely related products 
could be patented, blocking out other competitors; patents could be used 
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to “fence” in an invention, “block” the work of rivals, or “trawl” for in-
formation. Patent protection could be extended in time by patenting suc-
cessive modifications, and special terms and conditions could be written 
into patent licenses, dividing the market between producers by quota, 
territory, or product, and setting prices for various users. Moreover, pa-
tents could be pooled, resulting in a closed and collusive market, and 
international agreements involving patents provide the basis for trade 
agreements between firms and international cartels.85 
Hamilton made a number of proposals to improve the patent sys-
tem. He believed the Justice Department should push forward cases in-
volving restrictive covenants in order to more clearly define what could 
and could not be included in a patent license. He also believed that, while 
an easier and more expeditious method of validation of patents might 
prevent some pooling of patents, where pooling was required for effi-
cient production, the pool should be accepted and placed under public 
authority. Patents not in use should be cancelled or compelled to license, 
and higher standards for patentability should be established or different 
types of invention given different types of patent. Hamilton wanted to 
differentiate between genuinely novel and important inventions and mere 
modifications or variations. For example, he would prohibit applications 
for reissue or renewal. Hamilton also suggested the establishment of a 
“Public Counsel on Patents” to exercise general oversight of patent 
grants, of assignments and leases, and of all patent litigation, and with a 
right to intervene in applications and institute suits in order to protect the 
public interest.86 
These steps, however, still did not satisfy Hamilton, who believed 
they would “fall[] short” of answering the problem of “accommodat[ing] 
the [patent] grant to its corporate and industrial habitat.”87 If a “fresh 
slate were at hand,” he believed a system of compulsory licensing might 
be best, but in the existing circumstances, Hamilton suggested an expert 
commission of inquiry to consider a more fundamental redesign based on 
“further study and the formulation of a program.”88 A National Patent 
Planning Commission was established in 1942, but produced not a close 
study or a new program but a skimpy eleven-page report that “white-
washed” the patent system, ignored the major problems, made proposals 
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that would, if anything, lower the standards of patentability, and sug-
gested extending the time a patent grant could run.89 
The conclusion of this work on antitrust and patents was a growing 
concern on Hamilton’s part with the development of what he called 
“property rights in the market” or “market equities.”90 These property 
rights could take the form of a wide variety of business practices; the 
requirements of a profession or trade; the control of a strategic ingredient 
or resource; the protection given to local industries or favored producers 
by state or national regulations; regulations originally adopted for public 
benefit turned into barriers to entry; and patents, patent licenses, and pa-
tent pools used as a basis for the control of markets.91 Most significantly, 
Hamilton was concerned that corporations had discovered “that regula-
tion is a two-edged thing,” with controls that could be captured and put 
to uses never intended.92 
Hamilton’s concerns about the difficulty of controlling business 
were strengthened by the Court’s giving corporations the rights of natural 
persons. The treatment of the corporation as a natural individual required 
a series of legal “fictions” that effectively ignored the corporate ability to 
internationalize, to create subsidiaries and complex and intricate patterns 
of control, to choose and change domicile, and to exist in perpetuity or 
dissolve itself and reappear under a new name. He wrote that “the elabo-
rate web of ‘as-ifs’ which the courts have woven, have put corporate af-
fairs pretty largely out of the reach of the regulations we decree,”93 and 
that the techniques of public control encountered legal fictions “which 
have left fact far behind.” Hamilton did not provide a program for the 
“domestication of the corporate ghost”: 
But as a necessary antecedent to positive action we can bring our 
fictions up to date. The corporation is not a person; nor can it be 
made a person by a heroic . . . [act] of “judicial contemplation.” The 
corporation is a legal form into which a going concern is cast; the 
corporation is a device through which persons operating within bo-
dies of social usage carry on. If the law cannot escape the fiction as 
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an essential of its trade, it can at least replace its shopworn stock 
with fictions which bear some resemblance to . . . [reality].94 
B. The Politics of Industry 
In his work in the late 1940s and the 1950s, Hamilton gave his con-
cerns a more historical perspective. The failure of the market to properly 
control business in the public interest had resulted in a move towards 
regulation. But regulation broke down the previous division between 
state and economy. The most used form of regulatory device, the com-
mission, was particularly susceptible to be captured by the interests it 
was supposed to be regulating, and the campaign for regulation ultimate-
ly produced “its own counterrevolution.”95 The “interest to be regulated 
is compact, organized, mobile, [and] alert” to opportunities.96 “The pub-
lic interest is general, sluggish, diffused, [and] unable to effect a united 
front or to move in time.”97 The business to be regulated has the initia-
tive, the commission becomes bogged down in detail, staff who earn a 
reputation for understanding business can move into a career in industry, 
routines are established and maintained, and competition from new 
sources may be stifled to maintain older privileges.98 
Looking back at the NRA, Hamilton argued that it began as an ex-
ercise in price fixing, but as these “sanctions were toned down or re-
fused . . . business . . . gradually lost interest in NRA.”99 Despite the de-
mise of the NRA, it was “not without its effect upon the economic struc-
ture.”100 “Representatives of different companies . . . had been brought 
together in . . . Washington,” and the NRA left “many industries much 
more tightly organized than they had been before.”101 This move toward 
a “private government of industry” making use of “the devices and pro-
cedures of politics” was much advanced by World War II. The War Pro-
duction Board (WPB) brought business personnel to Washington to serve 
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as public officials, and “a hierarchy of primary contracts” resulted in a 
consolidation of business empires.102 The NRA gave representation to 
labor and the consumer, but in the WPB “it was the business interest 
alone which was enthroned.”103 
On the other hand, for Hamilton there was no going back to the 
market. That phase in industrial and institutional development had 
passed. Hayek and Mises,104 writing in 1944, were “voices from the 
grave.” Each sought a return to the separation of state and economy, but 
“the free market they [sought] to restore never was,” and the currents of 
the time were moving in other directions. State and economy had become 
inexorably intertwined and could not now be separated. There was no 
return to laissez faire: “[a] great corpus of the law stands as proof of the 
incapacity of the industrial system to regulate itself.”105 Hamilton be-
lieved mergers should not be allowed where technology did not require it 
and where there were dangers in the concentration of economic power. 
The grant of patent should be limited to “its proper office.”106 Govern-
ment procurement should not encourage concentration or restrictive prac-
tices. Hamilton wrote that the problem of commissions and administra-
tive agencies would remain “[u]ntil political invention contrives an ade-
quate substitute.”107 Business would continue to play a strategic game 
with the regulator. There was no panacea: the only way forward for eco-
nomic control in the public interest was that of “eternal vigilance.”108 
III. THE CHICAGO VIEW 
The history of the development of the “neoliberal” Chicago School 
in economics and in law and economics has been well-detailed by Robert 
Van Horne and Philip Mirowski.109 The Chicago School developed from 
what was, initially, an attempt to defend a classic liberal position against 
the institutionalist emphasis on regulation and increased government in-
tervention in the economy. One can see this in Frank Knight’s strong 
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attacks on institutionalist concepts of social control,110 and in Henry Si-
mons’s Positive Program for Laissez Faire.111 Simons’s program in-
cluded, among other things, a proposal for much stronger enforcement of 
the antitrust laws, based on clear per se rules. As against the tide of insti-
tutionalist and Keynesian thinking, Simons hoped that Chicago might be 
maintained as a “place where some political economists of the future 
may be thoroughly and competently trained along traditional-liberal 
lines.”112 Simons taught half-time in the law school. He died in 1946, but 
he was replaced by Aaron Director, who was appointed to the law school 
the same year. 
Simons’s wish began to bear fruit with the commencement in 1946 
in Chicago of the “Free Market Study.” This project was funded by the 
Volker Foundation, organized by Fredrick Hayek, led by Aaron Director, 
and involved Milton Friedman and many others at Chicago.113 As the 
project developed, those involved came to adopt a viewpoint that was 
relatively unconcerned with the problem of monopoly. Particularly im-
portant in this respect was Warren Nutter’s study of monopoly that took 
direct aim at A. R. Burns’s “decline of competition” thesis.114 The upshot 
was a view that innovation in products and techniques, or indeed the ex-
ercise of monopoly power itself, tended to undermine monopoly posi-
tions, provided that such monopoly was not supported by government 
regulations or licensing requirements. For Director, competition, even 
when not visible, had the ability to undermine and destroy all forms of 
monopoly.115 
Following on from the Free Market Study, Aaron Director took the 
lead on the Antitrust Project, which ran from 1953 to 1957.116 This 
project also involved Edward Levi of the law school. Interestingly, Levi 
knew Walton Hamilton well. He had been a student at Yale Law School 
and was later employed as Special Assistant to the Attorney General, 
working for several years under Thurman Arnold in the Antitrust Divi-
sion. He and Walton Hamilton were, at that time, very much on the same 
side on the monopoly issue.117 At least up until the early 1950s, Levi, like 
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Hamilton, argued that monopoly power and anticompetitive practices 
were common, and that the antitrust laws had not been effectively en-
forced. By the mid-1950s, however, Levi, along with Director, was ar-
guing the opposite view: that the problem of monopoly was not as se-
rious as previously thought and that many “exclusionary practices” did 
not enhance or extend monopoly power.118 
There were a number of key elements in the development of this 
line of argument: that many markets were not characterized by monopoly 
so much as by oligopoly, to which the theory of monopoly could not be 
readily applied; that the growth of many firms had come about through 
internal growth, not by takeovers, and could be the result of economies 
of scale; and that many “abuses” could be seen as forms of price discrim-
ination that did not create monopolies. It was Director and Levi’s posi-
tion that antitrust decisions should be based on their brand of economic 
theory and not on notions of “fair conduct.” They also supported a “rule 
of reason” approach, which may have come originally from the case-by-
case approach taken by Arnold and Hamilton, but which now presumed 
that exclusionary or coercive practices would not increase monopoly 
power except in exceptional cases and, as a result, shifted the burden of 
proof from the firms involved to the Department of Justice. Under this 
approach, special cases were possible, but a case-by-case inquiry would 
be necessary to determine if the specific practice concerned qualified.119 
Another central aspect of the Chicago School was its view of the 
goal of antitrust policy exclusively in terms of achieving increased eco-
nomic efficiency. Robert Bork argued that not only was this the original 
intention of the antitrust laws, but it was also the basis on which the 
courts had actually decided cases.120 In this view, other objectives, such 
as restraining the political power of large corporations, protecting small 
businesses, or protecting consumers, dropped from sight. Significantly, 
price discrimination can be consistent with economic efficiency while at 
the same time redistributing income from consumers to producers. This 
contrasted sharply with Hamilton’s emphasis on protecting the consumer 
interest. Moreover, the Chicago School presented efficiency as an objec-
tive criterion, so that the political preconceptions of judges were no long-
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er an important determinant of judicial decision-making. This view was, 
again, very much in contrast to the older realist tradition.121 
Economic concerns involving innovation and dynamic efficiency 
also inspired the Chicago School view of patents and intellectual proper-
ty rights. Patent policy had traditionally been seen as a balancing of the 
interest of the innovator in obtaining a return against the interest of the 
consumer in rapid and wide dissemination. Hamilton’s concern was with 
the abuse of the patent system to create positions of market power and 
actually restrict innovation. Here again, the Chicago School moved the 
balance towards the business interest on the grounds that patents would 
promote innovation and produce gains from technological progress. The 
moves toward compulsory licensing that were promoted by Hamilton 
and once widely supported had been reversed. Restrictive licensing 
agreements, the Chicago School argued, should not be challenged. Al-
though they represented attempts to capture more of the social surplus, 
they did not harm competition, and, indeed, drove the technology mar-
ket.122 
Finally, although Hamilton was quite likely a source for the Chica-
go School’s concerns with agency capture and of the ability of firms to 
turn government regulation into barriers to entry, Hamilton drew very 
different implications from this than have more recent Chicago School 
commentators. Friedman, for example, takes the argument to the point of 
expressing a preference for private monopoly over public monopoly or 
public regulation of monopoly.123 Along similar lines, Chicago School 
writers have expressed little, if any, concern over the penetration of busi-
ness into politics that seriously worried Hamilton. The Chicago School 
literature suggests that this stems from a focus on economic factors and 
an apparent belief that removing government from overt regulatory activ-
ity will result in a separation of the economic and the political, as if the 
market itself can somehow be made to lie outside of politics. This view is 
directly contrary to Hamilton’s view that the integration of big business 
and politics have gone much too far to ever be undone and that the solu-
tion must be sought elsewhere. 
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There have been recent reactions against what some see as the ex-
cesses of the Chicago view.124 This work has reintroduced the arguments 
that the political preconceptions of judges matter, and that efficiency 
considerations cannot explain court decisions.125 It has been argued that 
antitrust is (and always was) intended to protect consumers, not efficien-
cy,126 and that in many of its arguments concerning exclusionary dealing, 
restrictive patent licensing, mergers, and vertical arrangements, the Chi-
cago School has consistently “overshot” the mark.127 There seems, how-
ever, less interest in abandoning a rule of reason approach for per se 
rules. These developments appear to take us at least a little way back to-
wards a Hamiltonian position. 
CONCLUSION 
Hamilton’s institutional and realist blend of law and economics was 
characteristic of what has been called the “old” law and economics 
movement, to be later overtaken by the Chicago-based “new” law and 
economics.128 There are, very clearly, huge differences in the attitudes 
behind these two literatures. In the older literature, law was a potential 
instrument to control business, restrain monopoly power, and restrict 
practices. In the newer Chicago-based literature, the regulatory interven-
tions previously promoted and acted upon have been transformed into 
problems worse than the ones they were supposed to solve. In the ab-
sence of government regulation, it is now claimed, competition will have 
its corrosive effect on any established market positions. In the Chicago 
literature, there is an almost total lack of concern about the penetration of 
corporate power into the broader political arena, the increasingly restric-
tive use of patents and intellectual property rights, and the issue of corpo-
rate personality. All of these areas are even bigger and more crucial is-
sues now than when Hamilton was writing. 
Yet there are some links between these two schools. Hamilton and 
those associated with the Chicago position both moved away from the 
older view of antitrust as displayed in the work of Simons, and were not 
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in favor of per se rules, but of case-by-case study. The key difference lies 
in the direction of the prior presumption and the burden of proof.129 More 
importantly, as the review of Hamilton’s work illustrates, the older litera-
ture did not ignore the problems of agency capture and the restrictive use 
of regulation. In fact, Hamilton was one of the first to take these issues 
seriously. One cannot characterize institutionalist literature as being un-
concerned with the potential problems of government regulation. The 
primary difference between Hamilton and the Chicago School is that, for 
Hamilton, it is simply no longer possible to bring about a separation of 
state and economy. In a world of big business, the activities of the state 
affect the fortunes of private businesses in many and multifarious ways. 
The two are so intimately bound up with each other that no separation is 
possible. 
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